How the Pacers constantly serve different looks

The method to their randomness isn't merely a toss-up.

By: Caitlin Cooper I @C2_Cooper

"The hope is that it looks different every time."

That's what Pacers Head Coach Rick Carlisle told me during our conversation about random offense, when asked what playing without play-calls looks like in action. Of course, this also applies when the action needs to be reignited. In that regard, there isn't just variety in terms of which type of action gets triggered to jump-start the offense, there's also variety to how each of those actions gets expressed by the players involved -- and, sometimes, very specifically, because of which players are involved. At the macro-level, when the ball comes to rest, they might blur in front of the ball with an impromptu ghost screen, flash the big to the elbow to flow into split action, pitch the ball to the big at the top of the key and "get" it right back, flare a shooter to loosen up the help, or toss the ball from wing-to-wing and chase their pass with a screen. At the micro-level, however, each of those various methods for continuing to play after the play, can also look different every time -- even when it's the same action.

Confused? That's the goal, at least as it pertains to the defense. For our purposes, to provide a discernible visual of how the Pacers go about aiming to provide continuously different visuals, let's take a look at the multitude of looks that can be served out of just one of those aforementioned reignition methods: toss-and-chase.

Notably, whether at Summer League or deep in the postseason, the Pacers can be seen applying many of the same concepts. When the ball is in neutral at the wing, that will normally trigger a pass from one wing to the other that is followed by a screen (i.e. toss-and-chase).

There, what's significant about the toss from Johnny Furphy to Taelon Peter is 1) Peter was able to rise-and-fire from deep out of a lateral dribble (intriguing!), and 2) The actual act of pitching the ball behind the penetration, rather than just driving and drawing the help away from Peter holding his position at a standstill, means that the possibility of stunting from the corner or with secondary help has been eliminated.

In January, long before the Summer Pacers travelled to Vegas or the Actual Pacers advanced to the NBA Finals, Pascal Siakam pulled the same trigger against the Sixers, tossing the ball to an adjacent Tyrese Haliburton without allowing the ball to come to rest.

In contrast to Peter, as a play-finisher, Haliburton attacks ahead of the screen, cupping the ball like a football to rush through the help as one of the league's leaders in screen rejections per 100 possessions. Otherwise, the decision of whether to stick or slip the pick typically is determined by the coverage, at least when one of the team's primary initiators projects to be on-ball. Here, when the ball becomes neutralized with Obi Toppin at the wing, the Pacers once again launch into toss-and-chase (as Andrew Nembhard can be seen motioning for in the corner) as a spot trigger. Since the Clippers are switching positions 1-4, notice how Toppin screens below and stays below to attack the switch, aiming for the back pocket of the defender with a quick push off to slip out with momentum before finishing with a lefty scoop shot (he's really improved at this!) out of the pump-and-go.

It isn't just an action-specific spot trigger, though. It can also be skill-specific or player-specific. In this case, when Toppin receives the pass at the wing, spot the difference out of the toss-and-chase. Rather than rolling or slipping toward the basket, he blurs out to the perimeter, opening a wider gap for Aaron Nesmith, who is much more likely to turn the ball downhill with the benefit of friction than to create out of the pick-and-roll.

That isn't the only player-specific tweak, either. Pay attention to Ben Sheppard, both before and during the toss-and-chase. First of all, notice that he advances the ball to Obi Toppin at the wing instead of T.J. McConnell circling back out to the perimeter.

If that pass goes to McConnell, there wouldn't be as much gravity, by comparison to Toppin, on the blur out of the toss-and-chase for Nesmith. Additionally, look at how Sheppard cuts from corner-to-corner during the drive.

Ideally, McConnell would've reacted to Sheppard's movement by drifting into the corner so as to flatten out the defense and reposition the help at the nail, but that's still demonstrative of what makes Sheppard, as he was referred to by Rick Carlisle, a "soldier" in this system.

That said, in addition to the stick, slip, or blur decision, another way the toss-and-chase can take on a different look is when the toss never actually gets followed by the chase -- and for what reason. For example, consider this possession from the Eastern Conference Finals against the Knicks. For the most part, when the guards were screening for Siakam as the ball-handler in that series, New York didn't want to give up that switch, instead preferring to hedge-and-recover.

As such, with O.G. Anunoby maintaining his match-up with Siakam, there wasn't as much of an advantage to the toss-and-chase that would normally be triggered from that spot. Rather, after the adjacent "toss" is made to Nembhard, look who "soldiers" to meet the ball with a screen? Why, yes, it's Sheppard. Still, the action didn't stop there -- or rather, the action(s) didn't stop there. After the ball got leveled off in the paint, there was Sheppard again, touching a pass to Siakam to flow into (guess what?) toss-and-chase. In this case, with Karl-Anthony Towns tracking Toppin as the toss receiver, there's reason for Siakam to chase his pass, even with Anunoby still guarding him.

Not unlike the very first clip in this writing with Furphy tossing to Peter, there's once again an advantage to pitching the ball behind the penetration, as there's no one in position to stunt against Toppin from the corner when Towns gets pinned by Siakam with Anunoby reluctant to switch. Similar to Peter, it's a full circle moment, with Toppin circling to the top of the key for three. Of course, what also stands out in all of the organized chaos, is that even when the lines of who does what are blurred, creating a more dynamic and less predictable offensive ecosystem, the guards are still far more likely to blur out to the perimeter than roll. After all, look at how much room McConnell would have to dart to the basket here, if he was at least (uh) looking in the direction of the basket.

In that way, although everyone is seemingly doing a little bit of everything, the triggers aren't as much position-less as they are skill-specific, while also staying cognizant of which defenders are being involved and when. Similar to the previously cited clip with Sheppard advancing the ball to Toppin for the toss-and-chase instead of McConnell, it's telling that Haliburton didn't chase this pass to Nembhard against the Celtics, despite the fact that he got cut-off at the wing and has more gravity than McConnell.

Also telling? As I highlighted during the interview with Carlisle, Turner doesn't come back out of the paint to set a direct ball screen. Instead, Sheppard once again soldiers on, blurring in front of Nembhard to clear out the entire right side of the floor while involving Jordan Walsh. Overall, there's a lot to unpack there. Most likely, Haliburton didn't chase his own pass, because as a primary initiator, the trigger for him would likely more often involve someone meeting him with a screen. As for Turner, there might've been some consideration for the fact that he was cross-matched with Jayson Tatum, but also remember that Carlisle referred to this as a "hot-ball" offense. The Pacers ranked second in passes per 100 possessions last season and first in average touch length at just 2.647 seconds -- the lowest mark from any team in the last five seasons, per Genius Sports.

If Turner (or another big) comes back out of the paint to screen in that situation, the risk of stalling out the offense with the guard dribbling in place while waiting for the pick would be there, as would the potential for the defense to call out the coverage early and often on the approach. This isn't the only reason why the NBA averaged the fewest ball-screens per 100 possessions in the tracking-era last season (i.e. switching has become more frequent, some teams with playmaking bigs are putting a modern twist on old-school tactics, playing 5-out has led to more drive-and-kick without screens, Memphis barely ran pick-and-roll during the first half of last season while instead relying heavily on slide cuts/wheel action based on the direction of the ball, etc.), but it's certainly part of the calculus. Teams practice pick-and-roll defense more than anything. Pitches provide less opportunity to call out the action, and guard screens are typically quicker, while not providing as much distance to call out the coverage, as would be the case with a big coming back out of the paint to meet the ball.

All of which is to say that, the Pacers don't just add variety between reignition methods, they also add variety within reignition methods, staying cognizant of who is doing what as well as who they are involving and what coverage is being played while continuing to play after the play. When it comes to toss-and-chase, or whatever other concept they may end up playing out of, it isn't merely a toss-up -- amid all of the basketball as jazz, there's also a lot of method in their randomness.